

F B I

Date: 1/14/74

Transmit the following in _____

(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL

(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, WFO (62-)

Article Which Appeared In The
 "Washington Star-News", 1/13/74,
 Entitled "Blackmail of White House
 Cited in Military Spy Net" Which
 Mentions CHARLES E. RADFORD
 NATIONAL SECURITY WIRETAP MATTER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 1/18/88 BY SP-7 mac/BA

Reference is made to the newspaper article written
 by SEYMOUR M. HERSH, New York Times News Service, captioned as
 above and which mentions Yeoman First Class CHARLES E. RADFORD,
 U. S. Navy. *Lum*

DCReporter

On the afternoon of 1/13/74, []
 [] WFO, received a telephone call at his residence. The
 caller identified himself as [] (phonetic) and being with
 the "New York Times". He asked SA [] if the FBI had tapped
 the phone of CHARLES E. RADFORD. [] said that the
 name CHARLES RADFORD meant nothing to him. [] said "you had
 liaison with the C & P Telephone Company" and inquired if
 [] had not read the newspapers. [] made no response
 to the comment about his having been liaison with the telephone
 company and indicated that he had not read the newspapers.

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REC *jam*65-75102-199

18 AUG 27 1974

S-TS

2 - Bureau
 1 - WFO
 [] jak

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

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Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____

M

Per _____

U.S. Government Printing Office: 1972 - 455-574

AUG 28 1974 *jam*

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
INFORMATIVE NOTE
DATE 1/14/74 BY 61-7 Mac/Red Date 1/14/74

Attached refers to efforts by New York Times writer, [redacted] to get information from SA [redacted] [redacted] WFO, concerning a national security electronic surveillance (on Charles E. Radford) operated for The White House in 1971 and 1972.

WFO, in accordance with security measures exercised at the time, has nothing in its files concerning the electronic surveillance in question. Only a very limited number of persons, on an absolutely need-to-know basis, were privy to the matter, and only 3 or 4 Headquarters officials were aware of the matter. Records relating to it are maintained in INTD under sole control of Inspector T.J. Smith.

Due to the extremely sensitive nature of this matter and the fact that it will obviously be the subject of investigation by both the Congress and the Watergate Special Prosecution Force, we should decline to discuss the matter with [redacted] or other newsmen.

As a matter of interest, the [redacted] article would tend to indicate that the electronic surveillance on Radford was related to the matter of the Pentagon spying on Dr. Henry Kissinger. Insofar as the FBI was concerned there was absolutely no connection between the two matters.

TJS:mjt

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ST
p. 2
Mr. W. R. Wannall

Mr. T. J. Smith

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]

3/25/74

1 - Mr. Bowers
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. T. Smith

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b6
b7C

b6
b7C

b7E

b7E

[redacted]
**RODINO COMMITTEE REQUEST FOR
ACCESS TO FBI FILES**

CLASSIFIED BY: ~~SP-1 mac/bb~~
DECLASSIFY ON: ~~DATE 7/19/88~~

Legal Counsel to E. S. Miller memorandum 3/20/74 captioned as above, pointed out probability of the Rodino Committee requesting broad access to FBI files and data relative to the impeachment investigation. Memo also recommended that matter be reviewed and that conference be arranged with [redacted] and the Deputy Attorney General to discuss policy to be followed by the FBI. Suggestion was also made that Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski be made aware of the problem.

From the standpoint of Intelligence Division, requests for information by the Rodino Committee will likely involve several very sensitive areas of our operations and we feel that it is essential that some basic ground rules be established to preclude the public disclosure of data to the detriment of national security or national interest.

For example, the so-called [redacted]

(U) [redacted] Such information could seriously affect conduct of foreign affairs. (C)

Yet, this report, and the data relating to it, will surely be of great interest to the impeachment investigation.

Another example is the file relating to the 17 wiretaps placed for the White House between 5/69 and 2/71 on newsmen and White House aides. Here the issue of current litigation and possibility of future litigation is involved. If this file is aired in a public forum, the Government stands to lose millions of dollars in damage suits and there will certainly be serious invasion of privacy of concerned individuals. 65-75108-

1 - SPECOV (65-75085)

1 - [redacted] (65-75108)

1 - Ad Hoc Committee (62-113546)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOT RECORDED
102 APR 9 1974

CONTINUED - OVER

TJS:mah (9)

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

APR 17 1974

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall

RE:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
In the case of this file, disclosure by the Rodino Committee could hamper investigations by the Special Prosecutor.

The same applies to the file relating to wiretaps placed relative to the so-called "Pentagon Spy Case," which involved a Navy Yeoman, Charles E. Radford II, misappropriating classified documents and possibly leaking them to columnist Jack Anderson.

There are likely to be other areas of interest to the Rodino Committee which involve FBI use of electronic surveillances or other sensitive techniques, and we should be prepared well in advance of any requests to properly respond. A request, for example, concerning FBI use of surreptitious entry would have to be dealt with on the basis of the fact the FBI has no records of surreptitious entries.

We should expect the entire gamut of possible requests relating to national security-type investigations and techniques since the use or mis-use of such techniques on behalf of or on instructions of the White House will certainly constitute some grounds or basis for accusation for illegal acts by the President. And notwithstanding the right of the Rodino Committee to explore all such accusations and possibilities, the effect of public disclosures in many instances could have serious consequences on our ability to fulfill national security responsibilities.

OBSERVATIONS:

Intelligence Division agrees with necessity of conference between Bureau representatives and the Deputy Attorney General. Intelligence Division also agrees with suggestion that the Special Prosecutor be advised of need to develop and establish a necessary policy and that he be invited to participate in discussions.

Intelligence Division stands ready to assist in or take part in necessary discussions.

ACTION:

That this be forwarded to Legal Counsel in response to his memorandum of reference.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Moorer Knew, Yeoman Claims

WASHER, D.C. (UPI) — A former yeoman in the U.S. Armed Services Committee said he knew he was handling confidential White House documents in the admiral's Pentagon office.

In a series of interviews, Radford acknowledged that among the documents he handled were copies of Henry A. Kissinger's personal reports to President Nixon, or his secretaries, and other top-level documents. Kissinger, Nixon's national security adviser, is now secretary of State.

Radford was interviewed by the House Armed Services Committee Saturday with Sen. John C. Stennis, D-Miss., chairman of the panel. The hearing was held in the hearing room that holds the documents seized from the admiral's office in November 1973. The documents were seized from the admiral's office.

"It was a perfect thing," he said. "I had everybody's confidence."

During those months Radford was a stenographer clerk on the military liaison unit inside the White House. His function was to facilitate the coordination of papers between the National Security Council and Moorer, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In previously published interviews, Radford has stated that his superior officers on the military liaison unit, Rear Adm. Rembrandt C. Robinson and Rear Adm. Robert G. Welander, both urged him to take the material covertly.

Asked about Moorer's personal involvement, Radford said that at least four officers assigned to Moorer's office received the documents during his activities in late 1970 and throughout 1971. Those documents, he said, were "sanitized" — that is, all identifying marks were clipped off and the material pasted on a white sheet of paper.

THE YEOMAN said, however, that he did not sanitize documents intended for Moorer's attention. "He got them with all the markings," Radford said.

Furthermore, Radford said, he was always encouraged by his superior officers to believe that Moorer was grateful for his efforts. He quoted Robinson, who was killed in Southeast Asia in 1972, as telling him repeatedly that "Adm. Moorer was pleased with the information. I always got feedback."

RADFORD acknowledged that he is in an awkward position as an enlisted man challenging the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. But he said he has much more specific information about Moorer's involvement than he would tell the Senate.

Senators told newsmen Saturday that Radford was subpoenaed to appear before the full Armed Services Committee Feb. 14.

Assoc. Dir. _____
Asst. Dir.: _____
Admin. _____
Comp. Syst. _____
Ext. Affairs _____
Files & Com. _____
Gen. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Inspection ☒ _____
Intell. ☒ _____
Laboratory _____
Plan. & Eval. _____
Spec. Inv. _____
Training _____
Legal Coun. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director Sec'y _____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/18/88 BY SP-7 msc/100

The Washington Post _____
Times Herald _____
The Evening Star (Washington) A2
The Sunday Star (Washington) _____
Daily News (New York) _____
Sunday News (New York) _____
New York Post _____
The New York Times _____
The Daily World _____
The New Leader _____
The Wall Street Journal _____
The National Observer _____
People's World _____

65-75108-A
NOT RECORDED

Date 2-11-74

MAR 4 1974

File-5-135

MAR 4 1974

Assoc. Dir. ☒

Dep. AD Adm. ☐

Dep. AD Inv. ☒

Asst. Dir.:

Admin. ☐

Comp. Syst. ☐

Ext. Aff. ☒

Files & Com. ☐

Gen. Inv. ☒

Ident. ☐

Inspection ☒

Intell. ☒

Laboratory ☐

Plan. & Eval. ☐

Spec. Inv. ☐

Training ☐

Legal Coun. ☐

Telephone Rm. ☐

Director Sec'y ☐

COVE

The Moorer Affair 32

Secretary of State Kissinger and Admiral Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the Senate Armed Services Committee, portray the military spying in the White House as a "propaganda picture of civilian weakness and ethical confusion at the highest levels of the Government."

From the outset of this discreditable affair, Admiral Moorer has offered evasive explanations and denials that are now known to have been seriously misleading. Confused in his mind, he did not receive merely a couple of batches of documents that he was supposed to have reviewed. He was given a pile of papers from Mr. Kissinger's White House office by a Navy clerk and sent to Admiral Moorer over a period of many months.

These documents were not superfluous copies or of no interest because they contained no new information. In reality, Admiral Moorer received an "eyes only" report prepared by Gen. Kissinger on his first talk with Chinese Premier Chou En-lai and intended solely for the President. The Admiral also received documents that informed him of many details of the secret Paris peace talks with the North Vietnamese that were not provided to him by normal channels.

After President Nixon learned in December, 1971, of this spying, Admiral Moorer's liaison office at the White House was abolished and its staff, including the light-fingered clerk, transferred. But no disciplinary action was taken and a few months later, President Nixon reappointed Admiral Moorer for another two-year term as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

The President's line of reasoning remains undisclosed. All that is clear is that he reappointed Admiral Moorer even though the latter had used underlings to spy upon him. When a President condones such improper and insubordinate behavior on the part of the highest uniformed officer, then civilian control of the military becomes more shadow than substance.

Although the truth is gradually becoming known, Secretary Kissinger and Admiral Moorer even at this late date are less than candid. The Admiral minimizes the spying as the work of an "over-exuberant" clerk and "just an exchange within the organization." Even worse, he appears to have been willing in 1971 to make the clerk a scapegoat and prosecute him alone. That is scarcely how responsibility should run in a military chain of command.

For his part, Secretary Kissinger is also offering explanations that are evasive and misleading. He is trying to get brownie points with the Senate, and he is suggesting that the Navy was the one who was in the wrong. It is, especially, the Navy that is in the wrong. It is anything to which they need to pay particular attention. Such explanations are implausible. Young sailors, no matter how eager, do not steal documents from the President of the United States and pass them to admirals unless they are encouraged and protected by someone much higher in rank. It is too late now for doubletalk and dissimulation. It is time for everyone involved in this matter to tell the truth, the whole truth.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/18/98 BY SP-7mmc/DA

The Washington Post _____
Washington Star-News _____
Daily News (New York) _____
The New York Times 32
The Wall Street Journal _____
The National Observer _____
The Los Angeles Times _____

Date FEB 21 1974

65-75108-A
NOT RECORDED

MAR 4 1974

MAR 4 1974

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller *EM/TJS*

DATE: 6/27/73

JUNE

FROM : T. J. Smith *TJS*

SUBJECT: COVE

Mr. Felt _____
Mr. Baker _____
Mr. Callahan _____
Mr. Cleveland _____
Mr. Conrad _____
Mr. Gebhardt _____
Mr. Jenkins _____
Mr. Marshall _____
Mr. Miller, E.S. _____
Mr. Soyars _____
Mr. Thompson _____
Mr. Walters _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Baise _____
Mr. Barnes _____
Mr. Bowers _____
Mr. Herington _____
Mr. Conmy _____
Mr. Mintz _____
Mr. Eardley _____
Mrs. Hogan _____

Charles E. Radford II was the subject of telephone surveillances during the following periods at the indicated locations: his residence in Washington, D. C., during the period 12/23/71 to 1/5/72; [redacted] during the period 1/12/72 to 4/11/72; the [redacted] during the period 2/15/72 to 6/20/72; and at three separate locations at the Naval Reserve Training Center in Salem, Oregon, during the period 2/7/72 to 4/11/72.

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The logs of these surveillances are maintained behind file.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For information.

65-75108

TJS:glw *glw*
(2)

Enclosures

1 - Mr. T. J. Smith

6 ENCLOSURE Behind File
(SEE OVER)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/18/88 BY SP-7 MAC/BJ

REC *glw*

65-75108-197

JUN 28 1973

R.H.H.

5-TJS

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

JUN 28 1973 *glw*

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller **EM/TJS**
JUNE

DATE: 6/27/73

FROM : T. J. Smith **TJS**

SUBJECT: **COVE**

Mr. Felt _____
Mr. Baker _____
Mr. Callahan _____
Mr. Cleveland _____
Mr. Conrad _____
Mr. Gebhardt _____
Mr. Jenkins _____
Mr. Marshall _____
Mr. Miller, E.S. _____
Mr. Soyars _____
Mr. Thompson _____
Mr. Walters _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Baise _____
Mr. Barnes _____
Mr. Bowers _____
Mr. Herington _____
Mr. Conmy _____
Mr. Mintz _____
Mr. Eardley _____
Mrs. Hogan _____

Georgianna M. Prince was the subject of a telephone surveillance during the period 1/15/72 to 2/15/72.

The log of this surveillance consisting of 38 pages dated 1/15/72 to 2/15/72 is maintained behind file.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For information.

65-75108

TJS:ems
(2) *ems*

Enclosure

1 - Mr. T. J. Smith

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/18/88 BY SP-7 mac/RS

REC *jam*

65-75108-196

JUN 28 1973

ENCLOSURE Behind File

5-TJS

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

JUN 28 1973 *jam*

~~SECRET~~

February 26, 1973

JUNE

RE: NEW YORK TIMES AND WASHINGTON
POST ARTICLES CONCERNING ALLEGED
WIRETAPS ON NEWSMEN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The New York Times and Washington Post featured articles in their 2/26/73, issues, concerning a Time Magazine story in the issue coming out 2/26/73, which accuses the FBI of having tapped the telephones three years ago of six or seven reporters and a number of White House aides in connection with leaks from Administration aides. The article related that Acting Director L. Patrick Gray III continued the taps for 14 1/2 months before the U.S. Supreme Court overruled the wiretap policy in June.

No record is known to exist in the files of the FBI concerning the wiretapping of telephones of reporters and White House aides as described in these news articles. Some hearsay knowledge does exist, however, that some newsmen and individuals connected with the White House were the subject of electronic surveillances during a period from probably early 1969 until sometime in 1971. The White House, concerned over the number of serious leaks of highly sensitive information to various news sources, instructed through the Attorney General that certain specified individuals, including newsmen of one kind or another, should be covered by electronic surveillance in an effort to identify the source of the leak.

This project was very tightly held in the FBI and only a very few persons were even remotely aware of it. The project was personally handled by Former Assistant to the Director William C. Sullivan, and even though he was not to utilize any Agent personnel not absolutely essential to the project, he had SA Bernie A. Wells review the tapes and logs and dictate summaries for use of the White House. Only one secretary was used to take dictation, [redacted]. At least two Agents in the Washington Field Office had to know of the project, since the installation and monitoring had to be done in the field. These would have been Supervisor [redacted] and the Agent who handled technical matters in WFO.

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Classified by 6049 OK 10-1177
Exempt from GDS Category 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

NOT RECORDED

JUN 26 1973

JUN 26 1973

Declassify on: OADR 8-28-83

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Since the project was so sensitive, all records relating to it, and which would identify the persons who were covered by electronic surveillance, were maintained in the personal custody of William C. Sullivan. Following his departure from the FBI, a search was made in an effort to locate these records, but they were not found. Subsequently, former SA Bernie A. Wells, who had taken a job with the Department of Justice and who was then associated with former Assistant Attorney General Bob Mardian, revealed that Mardian was in possession of the records relating to this sensitive project.

Sullivan was confronted concerning the records and he referred all questions concerning the records to the Attorney General. Mr. Hoover contacted the Attorney General concerning the records and the Attorney General said they had been turned over to Mr. Ehrlichman at the White House. Mr. Mardian was also contacted and he claimed that he had destroyed the records. It was subsequently determined that Sullivan apparently had given the records in a sealed package to former Assistant Director C.D. Brennan with instructions to turn them over to Mardian. Brennan said that he had no knowledge of the records, nor that they were in the package delivered to Mardian. Brennan was almost certainly aware of the existence of the project, since something of that magnitude could not possibly be kept completely secret. For one thing, Wells, who was handling the actual work, worked in Division Five, and had to spend a great deal of time in Sullivan's office on something that was obviously not within the scope of Division Five's day-to-day activity. Wells, though discreet to a point, was also not discreet to the point that it was easy to put two and two together if one was inclined to do so.

Insofar as the allegation that these taps continued on after Mr. Gray took over as Acting Director, a different set of circumstances exist. No newsmen were involved. On 12/22/71, the Attorney General personally contacted Mr. W. Mark Felt and instructed him that a wiretap be immediately instituted on Charles Edward Radford II, a Navy Yeoman assigned to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and who was responsible for frequent contact with the White House and National Security Council. The Attorney General explained that these instructions had come directly from President Nixon following a Jack Anderson column 11/18/71, which disclosed conversations between the President and Mr. Henry Kissinger and between Dr. Kissinger and other high level officials at the White House. Radford, who was a member of the same church as Anderson (Mormon) was the primary suspect of the leak to Anderson.

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

After clearing the matter with Mr. Hoover, Mr. Felt instructed that a wiretap be instituted on Radford, and this was done 12/22/71. Subsequently, after the wiretap disclosed that Radford was confiding in various persons concerning the fact he was a suspect in the leak of information to Anderson, the Attorney General instructed that a wiretap be instituted on [redacted] a close associated of Radford. The fact that our records had disclosed that [redacted]

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(U)

[redacted] The wiretap on [redacted] was instituted [redacted]

Later, on 1/14/72, a wiretap was instituted, again on the personal instructions of the Attorney General, on Georgianna M. Prince, an employee of the State Department who was also close to Radford and to [redacted]. She had also served in Embassies abroad. (U)

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After a Navy investigation established that Radford was acquainted with Jack Anderson, and a polygraph examination indicated some unaccounted-for relations with Anderson, the Navy decided to transfer Radford to the West Coast. This was done rather suddenly and he ended up in Portland, Oregon at the home of [redacted]. The Attorney General again instructed that coverage be instituted of Radford [redacted]. [redacted] After several days the Navy sent Radford to the Naval Reserve Training Center, Salem, Oregon, and the Attorney General instructed that coverage be afforded Radford at the Naval Reserve Training Center, and at his private residence when he moved in and got a phone. Coverage was instituted at the NRTC 2/7/72, and at Radford's home on 2/15/72. (U)

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The taps on [redacted] and Prince were discontinued on 2/17/72. The taps on [redacted] and the NRTC were discontinued on 4/11/72. The tap on Radford was discontinued at 9:00 AM on 6/20/72, following the Supreme Court decision in the Keith Case. It was not discontinued until 6/20/72, as the other cases had been on 6/19/72, since we were awaiting instructions from the White House. (U)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Although we have a careful record of the various stages of the coverage of Charles Edward Radford II, we have no written instructions or authorizations from either the Attorney General or the White House concerning the matter. Our records have been kept completely isolated from other FBI records, and there are no indices whatsoever relating to this project. The number of wiretaps involved in the project (only the Radford project) was integrated into the total of wiretaps when such totals were used publicly by Mr. Hoover. This was at the specific instruction of Mr. Hoover.

At the time the Radford project was started in December, 1971, no other White House-requested electronic surveillance projects were in existence in the FBI. There is little likelihood that anyone connected with the previous projects, such as Sullivan, Wells, Brennan, [redacted] had any information whatsoever concerning the Radford project. Only Messrs. Hoover, Tolson, Felt, E.S. Miller, and T.J. Smith in the FBI knew of the Radford project. Reports, typed on unmarked bond as blind memoranda not identifying the FBI in any way, were sent to Mr. John D. Ehrlichman (Eyes Only) at the White House in double-sealed envelopes by Liaison. We know, however, that they were initially handled by one of Ehrlichman's [redacted] (who was known as [redacted] in the White House). Copies of all such reports were also furnished to the Attorney General (Eyes Only) in double-sealed envelopes, and delivered to the Attorney General's personal secretary by T.J. Smith in every instance. Copies of reports to the ATTORNEY General were not delivered to the present Attorney General.

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As a matter of pertinence, our coverage during the Radford project did in fact reveal a rather close and somewhat surreptitious relationship between Radford and Jack Anderson.

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Acting Director, FBI
Attn. Assistant Director Edward S. Miller

DATE: 8/1/72

FROM : SAC, Portland (66-626)

JUNE

SUBJECT: PORTLAND OFFICE
CONFIDENTIAL FUND NEEDS

ReBuairtel 7/27/72.

Enclosed herewith is receipt for \$297.93
covering payment to Pacific Northwest Bell, Portland,
Oregon, in connection with a confidential expenditure.

2 Bureau (Enc. 1)
1 Portland

JLM:lam
(3)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/18/88 BY SP-7MUC/RS

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

REC/SM

JUN 27 1973

ENCLOSURE

1-155



JUN 27 1973

5010-108-01

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan



Pacific Northwest Bell

JUL 1 72	
Balance from Last Bill (Deduct if Paid)	
Additional Message Units	
Long Distance (List Enclosed)	
Other Charges and Credits (List Enclosed)	
Directory Service	
Monthly Service Charge	122 68
U.S. Tax On Items Marked By ▶	
TOTAL DUE ▶	
	297 93

05R-4534 F
POR GCM
175 25 B

PD 6480 JUL 3 1 72
Linda King
297.93

Please Keep This Portion For Your Record

Airtel

1 - Mr. E.S. Miller *destroyed* *TJ*

7/27/72

TO: SAC, Portland

PERSONAL ATTENTION

FROM: Acting Director, FBI

JUNE

PORTLAND OFFICE
CONFIDENTIAL FUND NEEDS

Reurcal 7/26/72 to Assistant Director Edward S. Miller.

Enclosed is Treasurer's Check in amount of \$297.93 to cover the confidential expenditure. Submit receipts incidental to the confidential expenditure to the personal attention of Assistant Director Edward S. Miller.

Enclosure

1 - Mr. Row

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/18/88 BY SP-7 mac/BB

TJS:mah

(5) *mah*

TJS

66-81
66-2102
UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Felt _____
Bates _____
Bishop _____
Callahan _____
Campbell _____
Cleveland _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Jenkins _____
Marshall _____
Miller, E.S. _____
Ponder _____
Soyars _____
Valters _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Kinley _____
Mr. Armstrong _____
Ms. Herwig _____
Mrs. Neenan _____

EM

JUN 27 1973 *am*

MAIL ROOM ☐

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : MR. FELT

DATE: 7/26/72

FROM : Mr. E. S. Miller *EM*

OCOVE

SUBJECT: PORTLAND OFFICE
CONFIDENTIAL FUND NEEDS

7

Felt	_____
Mohr	_____
Rosen	_____
Bates	_____
Bishop	_____
Callahan	_____
Campbell	_____
Casper	_____
Cleveland	_____
Conrad	_____
Dalbey	_____
Malone	_____
McGuire	_____
Moynihan	_____
Soyars	_____
Waikart	_____
Walters	_____
Tele Room	_____
Holmes	_____
Gandy	_____

EM/DP

SAC Julius Mattson called to advise that he needed \$297.93 in his confidential fund to defray the expense of operating a highly sensitive operation.

RECOMMENDATION:

That above amount be forwarded to SAC to handle above expenditure.

TJS:mah
(2) *mah*

TJS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE *7/14/88* BY *SP-7 mac/Btz*

REC/jam

65-75108-192

JUN 27 1973

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN *66-81*
66-2102

Jan
June 21, 1972

JUNE

RE: CHARLES E. RADFORD II

For your information coverage on the above-captioned individual, Salem, Oregon, was discontinued at 9:00 AM Pacific Time, June 20, 1972. No pertinent information was developed subsequent to the last report. *Jan*

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/18/88 BY SP-7 mce/88

65-75108-191
NOT RECORDED

JUN 26 1973


JUN 26 1973 *Jan*

June 15, 1972

JUNE

RE: CHARLES E. RADFORD II

The following is a summary of nonpertinent information developed on June 14, 1972, from coverage of Charles E. Radford, Salem, Oregon.



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Nothing was discussed concerning the situation involving Radford.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/18/88 BY SP-7 mac/88

65-75108-188
NOT RECORDED

JUN 26 1973 *jm*

JUN 26 1973



Pacific Northwest Bell

MAY 1 72

05R-4534

POR GCM

Balance from Last Bill (Deduct if Paid)

Pd 5/1/72

~~298 71~~

Additional Message Units () ▶

Long Distance (List Enclosed) ▶

Other Charges and Credits (List Enclosed)

Directory Service

Monthly Service Charge ▶

175 25

U.S. Tax On Items Marked By ▶

00

TOTAL DUE ▶

~~473 96~~

175.25

Pd. J King
Please Keep This Portion For Your Record
PACIFIC NORTHWEST BELL TELEPHONE CO

27188 MW3172

175252

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Acting Director, FBI
Attn. Assistant Director Edward S. Miller

DATE: 5/31/72

FROM : SAC, Portland (66-626)

JUNE

SUBJECT: PORTLAND OFFICE
CONFIDENTIAL FUND NEEDS

ReBuairtel 5/23/72.

Enclosed herewith are three receipts, totalling \$390.45, covering payment to Pacific Northwest Bell, Portland, Oregon, in connection with a confidential expenditure.

2 Bureau (Encs. 3)
1 Portland

JLM:lam
(3)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/18/98 BY SP-7 mac/RB

ENCLOSURE

REC-44

JUN 27 1973

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN



Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

MAY 1 72

15R-4529 P

G POR DM

Pd 5/1/72

~~62 00~~

Balance from Last Bill (Deduct if Paid)

Additional Message Units

Long Distance (List Enclosed)

Other Charges and Credits (List Enclosed)

Directory Service

Monthly Service Charge

J.S. Tax On Items Marked By

12 40

00

TOTAL DUE

~~74 40~~

12 40

Please Keep This Portion For Your Record

PACIFIC NORTHWEST BELL TELEPHONE CO.

Pd. J. King

27187 113172

12402

Airtel

Destroyed
1 - Mr. E.S. Miller *TJS*

5/23/72

REC
TO: SAC, Portland
65-75108-179
FROM: Acting Director, FBI

PERSONAL ATTENTION

PORTLAND OFFICE
CONFIDENTIAL FUND NEEDS

JUNE

Reurcal 5/22/72 to Assistant Director Edward S. Miller.

Enclosed is Treasurer's Check in amount of \$390.45 to cover the confidential expenditure. Submit receipts incidental to the confidential expenditure to the personal attention of Assistant Director Edward S. Miller.

Enclosure

1 - Mr. Row *Detached by [unclear]*


TJS:mah
(5) *[initials]*

EM

TJS

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 66-81 66-2102

Felt _____
Mohr _____
Rosen _____
Bates _____
Bishop _____
Callahan _____
Campbell _____
Casper _____
Cleveland _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Miller, E.S. _____
Ponder _____
Soyars _____
Waikart _____
Walters _____
Tele. Rm. _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____



ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/19/88 BY SP-7 mac/DB

JUN 27 1973 *[initials]*

MAIL ROOM ☒

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : MR. FELT

DATE: 5/23/72

FROM : Mr. E. S. Miller *EM/TJS*

SUBJECT: PORTLAND OFFICE
CONFIDENTIAL FUND NEEDS

Felt _____
Mohr _____
Rosen _____
Bates _____
Rosen _____
Casper _____
Cleveland _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Miller, E. S. _____
Ponder _____
Soyars _____
Waikart _____
Walters _____
Tele Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

SAC Julius Mattson called to advise that he needed \$390.45 in his confidential fund to defray the expense of operating a highly sensitive operation.

RECOMMENDATION:

That above amount be forwarded to SAC to handle above expenditure.

TJS:mah
(2)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/19/98 BY SP-7 mac/BS

REC-44

65-75108-179

JUN 27 1973

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 1101

West Bell

MAR 1 72

05R-4531

G POR DM

123 57

Balance from Last Bill (Deduct if Paid)

Additional Message Units

() ▶

Long Distance (List Enclosed)

Installation

▶

43 62

Other Charges and Credits (List Enclosed)

Directory Service

Monthly Service Charge

U.S. Tax On Items Marked By ▶

507 00

00

TOTAL DUE ▶

674 19

Please Keep This Portion For Your Record



Pacific Northwest Bell

APR 1 72

05R-4531

G POR DM

674 19 B

Balance from Last Bill (Deduct if Paid)

Additional Message Units () ▶

Long Distance (List Enclosed) ▶

Other Charges and Credits (List Enclosed)

Directory Service

Monthly Service Charge ▶

U.S. Tax On Items Marked By ▶

507 00

00

TOTAL DUE ▶

1,181 19

Please Keep This Portion For Your Record

M. Cotton

APR 1 1972 1,181 19



Pacific Northwest Bell

MAR 1 72

15R-4529

G POR DM

~~28 57~~

Balance from Last Bill (Deduct if Paid)

Additional Message Units () ▶

Long Distance (List Enclosed) ▶

Other Charges and Credits (List Enclosed)

Directory Service

Monthly Service Charge ▶

31 00

U.S. Tax On Items Marked By ▶

00

TOTAL DUE ▶

59 57

Please Keep This Portion For Your Record



Pacific Northwest Bell

APR 1 72

15R-4529

G POR DM

31 00 B

Balance from Last Bill (Deduct if Paid)

Additional Message Units

Long Distance (List Enclosed)

Other Charges and Credits (List Enclosed)

Directory Service

Monthly Service Charge

U.S. Tax On Items Marked By ▶

TOTAL DUE ▶

31 00

00

62 00

Please Keep This Portion For Your Record

McCartan

APR 1 72

62.00

Pacific Northwest Bell

MAR 1 72

05R-4534
G POR DM

Balance from Last Bill (Deduct if Paid)		
Additional Message Units	() ▶	
Long Distance (List Enclosed)	▶	
Other Charges and Credits (List Enclosed)	▶	
Directory Service		51 79CR
Monthly Service Charge		
U.S. Tax On Items Marked By ▶		175 25
		00
	TOTAL DUE ▶	123 46

Please Keep This Portion For Your Record



Pacific Northwest Bell

APR 1 72

05R-4534

POR DM

123 46 B

Balance from Last Bill (Deduct if Paid)

Additional Message Units

Long Distance (List Enclosed)

Other Charges and Credits (List Enclosed)

Directory Service

Monthly Service Charge

U.S. Tax On Items Marked By ▶

175 25

00

TOTAL DUE ▶

298 71

Please Keep This Portion For Your Record

M. Cotton

PO C
PNB

0 4 0 B 172

298.71



Pacific Northwest Bell

APR 1 72

05R-4534

POR DM

123 46 B

Balance from Last Bill (Deduct if Paid)

Additional Message Units

Long Distance (List Enclosed)

Other Charges and Credits (List Enclosed)

Directory Service

Monthly Service Charge

U.S. Tax On Items Marked By ▶

175 25

00

TOTAL DUE ▶

298 71

Please Keep This Portion For Your Record

M. Cotton

PD 6
PNR 0 4 5 8 1 72

298.71E



Pacific Northwest Bell

APR 1 72

05R-4534

POR DM

123 46 B

Balance from Last Bill (Deduct if Paid)

Additional Message Units () ▶

Long Distance (List Enclosed) ▶

Other Charges and Credits (List Enclosed)

Directory Service

Monthly Service Charge

U.S. Tax On Items Marked By ▶

175 25

00

TOTAL DUE ▶

298 71

Please Keep This Portion For Your Record

M. Cotton

PD 0 4 0 8 1 72

298.71